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THE KARADŽIĆ GENOCIDE CONVICTION: INFERENCES, 
INTENT, AND THE NECESSITY TO REDEFINE GENOCIDE 
Milena Sterio* 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2016, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, 
of genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to forty years 
imprisonment.1 In particular, Karadžić was found guilty of genocide in 
Srebrenica, the persecution of Bosnians and Croats throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, terrorizing the population of Sarajevo, and taking United Nations 
(U.N.) peacekeepers hostage.2 According to the ICTY Trial Chamber verdict, 
the crimes were committed as part of four joint criminal enterprises (JCE) in 
which Karadžić was a protagonist.3 In July 2016, Karadžić announced, through 
his defense counsel, that he would appeal the verdict on the ground that he did 
not get a fair trial—according to Karadžić’s attorney, Peter Robinson, “[t]he trial 
chamber considered him guilty in advance and then constructed the verdict to 
justify its presumption.”4 Robinson also stated that “[t]he chamber concluded 
[Karadžić] had an intention to kill the captives from Srebrenica on the basis of 
its interpretation of a coded telephone conversation. Such a way of drawing 
conclusions is unfounded and incorrect, so the verdict is unfair.”5 The ICTY 
prosecutors announced, on their end, that they also would appeal the verdict in 
order to ask “for Karadzic [sic] to be found guilty of the genocide in seven other 
Bosnian municipalities in 1992, and for his sentence to be raised to life 
imprisonment.”6 The appeals chamber of the Mechanism for International 
Tribunals, which is taking over the remaining work of the ICTY as it shuts down, 
 
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  
 1 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶ 6070–72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf.  
 2 Id. ¶¶ 5824, 5849–50, 5950–51, 6002, 6047. 
 3 Id. ¶ 6046. 
 4 Radosa Milutinovic, Radovan Karadzic Appeals Against Genocide Conviction, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. (July 22, 2016), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/Karadžić-files-appeal-notice-07-22-2016. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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will rule on the appeals, but as of now there is no clear deadline for delivering 
the ruling.7 
In anticipation of the appeals chamber’s definitive ruling on the Karadžić 
verdict, this Article will address and analyze Karadžić’s genocide conviction. 
The Article will specifically focus on the interpretation of genocide espoused by 
the ICTY judges in this recent decision. As other commentators have already 
noted, the most striking finding of the ICTY Trial Chamber was that Karadžić 
had specific genocidal intent regarding the Srebrenica killings.8 During the 
Karadžić trial, the Prosecution had not been able to provide “smoking gun” 
evidence that Karadžić knew about the killings in Srebrenica as they were taking 
place; instead, the Prosecution’s case was essentially circumstantial.9 The Trial 
Chamber accepted the Prosecution’s reasoning and drew inferences from 
indirect evidence.10 It found that Karadžić was a participant in a JCE, sharing its 
common purpose: to eliminate Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica. This common 
purpose eventually evolved to encompass the agreement to kill all Bosnian adult 
males and to forcibly transfer women and children.11 The most important item 
of evidence that the Trial Chamber took into account was a conversation that 
Karadžić had with another official, Miroslav Deronjić.12 From this conversation, 
the Trial Chamber inferred first that Karadžić knew about the killings at 
Srebrenica as they were taking place and second that Karadžić, because he did 
not do anything after this conversation, must have shared Deronjić’s (and 
others’) intent to kill Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica.13 This interpretation of the 
intent requirement under the Genocide Convention and the customary law 
definition of genocide is novel and had not been espoused by other tribunals in 
the past. 
This Article will first discuss and analyze the Genocide Convention and its 
strict definition of genocide and the “intent” requirement. It will then focus on 
the evolution of this definition, in light of the recent Karadžić case. This Article 
will demonstrate that in modern-day conflicts, the finding of genocidal intent 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 See infra Part III. 
 9 See Marko Milanovic, ICTY Convicts Radovan Karadzic, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www. 
ejiltalk.org/icty-convicts-radovan-Karadzic/. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 5798, 5810–11, 5814 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_ 
judgement.pdf.,  
 12 Milanovic, supra note 9. 
 13 Id.  
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may be an impossible task for the prosecution and that the ICTY Trial 
Chamber’s method of inferring intent based on knowledge and other indirect 
factors may be the only way that prosecutors will be able to obtain future 
genocide convictions. This Article will then discuss a possible re-drafting and 
re-conceptualizing of the genocide definition, in light of modern-day conflicts 
and warfare. 
I. GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A STRICT DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE 
The term “genocide” was coined by Polish jurist, Raphaël Lemkin, to 
describe the Nazis’ actions during World War II against the Jews.14 According 
to Lemkin, “[g]enocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and 
the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual 
capacity, but as members of the national group.”15 Lemkin coined the term 
“genocide” by combining the Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin word 
caedere (to kill).16 According to Lemkin’s view of the crime of genocide, “the 
critical elements of genocide were not the individual acts, though they may be 
crimes in themselves, but the broader aim to destroy entire human 
collectivities.”17 
The Holocaust, as well as the trial of the Nazi defendants at Nuremberg, 
spurred states to negotiate a treaty on genocide to criminalize these atrocities.18 
In December 1948, most U.N. member states agreed upon the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention).19 Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) 
 
 14 What is Genocide?, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/ 
en/article.php?ModuleId=10007043 (last updated July 2, 2016). 
 15 RAPHAËL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).  
 16 Beth Van Schaack, Engendering Genocide: The Akayesu Case Before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, SANTA CLARA L. DIGITAL COMMONS, July 2008, at 1, 15. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the 
International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 231, 249 (2002). Although the crime of genocide was not 
included in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal established to prosecute Nazi war criminals at 
Nuremberg, the indictment at Nuremberg charged the defendants with “deliberate and systematic genocide” and 
allegations of genocide appeared in the prosecutors’ closing statements. Id. 
 19 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
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Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group.20 
The definition of genocide, as iterated in the Genocide Convention, has 
become customary international law as well as a jus cogens norm of international 
law.21 As such, this definition is binding on all states.22 
The definition of genocide is narrow, as it requires proof that one of the 
enumerated groups (national, ethnical, racial, or religious) was targeted “as 
such.” Scholars have noted that the definition of genocide under the Genocide 
Convention is historically attributable to the role of the Soviet Union in this 
treaty’s negotiation—in the late 1940s, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was 
committing massive purges of political enemies, and the Soviet Union did not 
want the persecution of members of political groups to constitute genocide.23 
The specific phrase “as such” had been offered by the Venezuelan representative 
during the Genocide Convention treaty negotiations as a compromise position, 
in order to conclude an ongoing discussion about the questions of intent and 
motive in the definition of genocide.24 A first draft of the Convention had 
included, after enumerating protected groups, the phrase “on grounds of the 
national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members.”25 
The Venezuelan amendment substituted the words “as such” in lieu of the longer 
phrase, and the amendment’s author justified his proposal by explaining that an 
enumeration of motives was useless and even dangerous.26 According to the 
Venezuelan representative, a restrictive enumeration of motives could be abused 
by genocidaires to help them avoid being charged with genocide, as they would 
be able to argue that their crimes had been committed for reasons other than 
 
 20 Id. art. II.  
 21 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. 
& Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 18 ¶ 161 (Feb. 26, 2007); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-
T, Judgement ¶ 495 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 22 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 47 (4th ed. 2015). 
 23 Id. at 483. 
 24 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 572 (1st ed. 2002) 
(citing excerpt from HURST HANNUM & DAVID HAWK, THE CASE AGAINST THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA (1986)) [hereinafter DUNOFF ET AL., 1st ed.]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
STERIO GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/20/2017 2:13 PM 
2017] THE KARADŽIĆ GENOCIDE CONVICTION 275 
those listed in Article II.27 “The purpose of [his amendment] was to specify that, 
for genocide to be committed, a group – for instance, a racial group – must be 
destroyed qua group.”28 
In other words, in order to secure a genocide conviction, a prosecutor must 
be able to demonstrate that members of a protected group were targeted because 
of their membership in that protected group. It should also be noted that genocide 
under the Convention does not require the actual destruction of a protected 
group; instead, the crime is complete if one of the enumerated acts was 
committed with the specific intent.29 However, the motive or motives behind the 
intent to destroy a protected group are irrelevant.30 As one scholar has noted, 
“[p]rovided the requisite intent exists, it matters not whether that intent was 
fueled by animus toward the protected group, by hopes of financial gain, by a 
personal grudge against individual group members, by ideological or wartime 
resistance, by misguided beneficence . . . or indeed by any reason at all.”31 
While motive evidence generally has probative value toward establishing 
genocidal evidence, such evidence does not suffice alone to establish the mens 
rea of genocide. Thus, establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that genocide has 
occurred may be a difficult prosecutorial task, and some instances of massive 
killings, perhaps regrettably, do not amount to genocide under the Genocide 
Convention. 
For example, a debate persists whether the Cambodian Khmer Rouge regime 
committed acts of genocide against the Cambodian population in the late 
1970s.32 The Khmer Rouge regime “launched a revolution abolishing all 
existing societal institutions, expunging all foreign influences, and transforming 
the entire population into a collective workforce,” and the regime also “acted 
ruthlessly against all elements suspected of being hostile to the new order.”33 
The Khmer Rouge regime particularly targeted professionals, such as teachers 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (alteration in original). 
 29 Nersessian, supra note 18, at 256 (noting that genocide is an inchoate offense, which criminalizes certain 
acts with a particular mental state, regardless of whether such acts actually lead to the intended harm).  
 30 See id. at 268. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Compare Phnom Penh, Did the Khmer Rouge commit genocide?, IRIN (Sept. 14, 2015), http:// 
www.irinnews.org/report/101989/did-khmer-rouge-commit-genocide, with Cambodian Genocide, WORLD 
WITHOUT GENOCIDE, http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/cambodian-genocide (last 
updated Mar. 2015). 
 33 DUNOFF ET AL., 1st ed., supra note 24, at 564. 
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and students, as well as those who spoke a foreign language and were suspected 
of having ties to foreign countries.34 It may be argued that these acts constituted 
genocide under the Genocide Convention because the Khmer Rouge regime 
displayed a clear intent to destroy a national group “in part.”35 On the other hand, 
these acts, however reprehensible, arguably fell short of genocide because the 
victims were not targeted simply because of their membership in the protected 
Cambodian national group, but instead because of their status “as members of 
political, professional, or economic groups.”36 In addition, some were simply 
victims of random violence or harsh conditions imposed on the Cambodian 
society at large.37  
Scholars have pointed out that the Genocide Convention drafters most likely 
did not contemplate the mass killing of one segment of the population by another 
group or segment of the same national population.38 Thus, according to this 
view, the killing of millions of Cambodians because of their specific social, 
economic, or political status did not constitute genocide under the Genocide 
Convention, and it would be legally wrong to attempt to interpret the Convention 
more broadly in order to capture these types of acts. As Steven Ratner and Jason 
Abrams have suggested, “[a]doption of the alternative legal interpretation, 
though morally appealing, would, as a practical matter, enlarge the deliberately 
limited scope of the Convention’s list of protected groups, insofar as almost any 
political, social, or economic element of a population can be viewed as a part of 
a larger national group.”39 
Similarly, a debate persists about whether the killings of thousands of Poles 
at Katyn Forest by the Soviets during World War II constitute genocide.40 In 
early 1940, members of the Soviet secret police murdered thousands of Poles—
mostly members of the Polish intelligentsia, such as military officers, doctors, 
 
 34 Cambodia 1975, PEACE PLEDGE UNION, http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_cambodia1.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2017).  
 35 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 285–87 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter RATNER & 
ABRAMS, 2d ed.].  
 36 Id. at 286. 
 37 Jason Abrams, The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 
35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 305 (2000–2001). 
 38 See THOMAS K. FORSTER, THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE: ISSUES OF GENOCIDAL 
INTENT WITH REGARD TO THE KHMER ROUGE MASS ATROCITIES 127 (2012). 
 39 RATNER & ABRAMS, 2d ed., supra note 35, at 287. 
 40 Milena Sterio, Katyn Forest Massacre: Of Genocide, State Lies, and Secrecy, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 615, 626–28 (2012).  
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engineers, police officers, and teachers.41 Stalin, the Soviet leader, had sought to 
eradicate these members of the Polish society because he planned with Adolf 
Hitler to conquer and divide Poland, and he wished to preventively eliminate 
members of the Polish society whom he perceived as potential opposition.42 The 
Katyn Forest killings were discovered by the Germans in 1943, but the Soviets 
maintained that the killings had been committed by the Germans.43 After World 
War II, despite evidence of Soviet responsibility for this massacre, the Allied 
Forces accepted the Soviet denial of responsibility and officially blamed the 
Germans.44 The Katyn Forest Massacre remained taboo until the end of the Cold 
War when scholars and various government officials began to embrace the truth 
behind these killings and to officially designate the Soviet Union as the culprit.45 
As in the Cambodian context, members of the Polish society at Katyn were 
targeted not because they were members of the Polish national group (a 
protected group under the Genocide Convention), but because they were 
members of the Polish intelligentsia (an unprotected group under the 
Convention). Many agree that “[t]he Soviets certainly had the intent to destroy 
a part of the Polish national group. However, the subgroup that they targeted 
(the Polish intelligentsia) is not defined under the Genocide Convention, which 
only contemplates the destruction of ‘national, ethnic, racial or religious’ groups 
‘as such.’”46 
Under a strict reading of the Genocide Convention, the Katyn Forest 
Massacre does not amount to genocide in the same way that the killings and 
other inhumane acts committed by the Khmer Rouge regime against certain 
members of the Cambodian population did not constitute genocide.47 One could 
argue, however, that the Katyn killings did constitute genocide under a broader 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention. The Soviets certainly intended to 
destroy a part of the Polish national group.48 However, “[i]t does not matter that 
the [Genocide] Convention does not specifically enumerate the subgroup 
[(members of the Polish intelligentsia)], as the listing of protected groups in 
 
 41 Id. at 625; see Maria Szonert-Binienda, Was Katyn a Genocide?, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 633, 715 
(2012). 
 42 Sterio, supra note 40, at 616. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 626–28. 
 46 Id. at 627. 
 47 RATNER & ABRAMS, 2d ed., supra note 35, at 286. 
 48 Sterio, supra note 40, at 627.  
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Article II [is not] exhaustive.”49 In other words, the Convention drafters certainly 
intended for the treaty to cover crimes such as the Katyn Forest killings or the 
Khmer Rouge killings. The drafters must have wanted for such rogue leaders as 
Stalin or Pol Pot to face criminal responsibility. Thus, a strict interpretation of 
the Genocide Convention would have the perverse effect of absolving potential 
criminals of responsibility and denying justice to victims of horrific atrocities. 
The Katyn Forest Massacre could be interpreted as constituting genocide under 
a less narrow reading and interpretation of the Genocide Convention.50 
The Genocide Convention remains the most important treaty on the crime of 
genocide, and its definition of genocide has been embraced and at times 
reproduced verbatim in the statutes of modern-day international criminal 
tribunals.51 The interpretation and understanding of genocide thus remain 
crucial in present-day cases pending before various tribunals.52 The Part below 
will discuss recent genocide cases decided in the international tribunals, such as 
the Akayesu case in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the 
Bosnia law suit against Serbia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the 
Karadžić case in the ICTY. This Part will demonstrate the difficulty of 
establishing genocidal intent in order to secure a conviction under the Genocide 
Convention and the necessity for prosecutors and judges to resort to inferences 
in order to establish such intent. 
II. MODERN-DAY UNDERSTANDING OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: 
AKAYESU, KAYISHEMA, BOSNIA V. SERBIA, AND KARADŽIĆ 
The ICTR completed its first trial in October 1998 when it convicted Jean-
Paul Akayesu, a Rwandan regional official, of genocide.53 The Akayesu 
judgment was the first time in history that an international court had interpreted 
 
 49 Id. at 628. 
 50 For a general view advocating for a broader reading of the Genocide Convention, see John Quigley, 
International Court of Justice as a Forum for Genocide Cases, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243 (2007) 
(documenting the dissatisfaction with a narrow interpretation of the Genocide Convention). 
 51 See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 286, 288–89, 354–55 (1999). 
 52 See Nersessian, supra note 18, at 276; Tatiana E. Sainati, Toward a Comparative Approach to the Crime 
of Genocide, 62 DUKE L.J. 161, 161 (2012). 
 53 Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 517, 518, 528 (1996-1997); Press Release, U.N. Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals, Jean-Paul Akayesu Sentenced to Life Imprisonment (Oct. 2, 1998). 
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and applied the Genocide Convention.54 The Court embraced a more expansive 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention when it decided that “the intention of 
the drafters of the Genocide Convention . . . was patently to ensure the 
protection of any stable and permanent group.”55 The ICTR thus held that groups 
other than the four enumerated in the Genocide Convention should be protected, 
as long as “membership . . . would seem to be normally not challengeable by its 
members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often 
irremediable manner.”56 In other words, the ICTR embraced “a flexible, 
subjective view of ethnicity”57 in order to ensure that groups in which 
membership is determined at birth and not subject to change are protected groups 
under the Genocide Convention. The ICTR found that the Tutsis constituted an 
immutable, stable, and permanent ethnic group, which, according to the tribunal, 
would fall within one of the four protected groups in the definition of the 
Genocide Convention.58 On the issue of genocidal intent, the ICTR adopted a 
traditional view, requiring the showing of special intent: 
the act must have been committed against one or several individuals, 
because such individual or individuals were members of a specific 
group, and specifically because they belonged to this group. Thus, the 
victim is chosen not because of his individual identity, but rather on 
account of his membership of a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group. The victim of the act is therefore a member of a group, chosen 
as such, which, hence, means that the victim of the crime of genocide 
is the group itself and not only the individual.59 
 
 54 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in 
the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/54/315 
(Sept. 7, 1999). Although Akayesu was charged with genocide under the ICTR Statute, Article 2, it should be 
noted that the ICTR Statute definition of genocide embraced, verbatim, the Genocide Convention’s definition 
of genocide. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement ¶ 494 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 55 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶¶ 511, 516. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Van Schaack, supra note 16, at 21. 
 58 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 702. 
 59 Id. ¶ 521. 
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The ICTR recognized, however, that establishing genocidal intent through 
concrete evidence is a particularly difficult legal task.60 The Court held that 
genocidal intent may be inferred in certain circumstances.61 
The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal 
intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general context of 
the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against 
that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same 
offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities 
committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or 
furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting 
victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while 
excluding the members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to 
infer the genocidal intent of a particular act.62 
The Akayesu Court thus adopted a more expansive view of which groups 
may constitute one of the four protected groups under the Genocide Convention, 
but embraced a narrow view of the intent requirement by emphasizing that a 
protected group must be targeted “as such.”63 In recognizing the difficulty in 
establishing such specific intent, the ICTR judges confirmed that intent may be 
inferred and deduced within the general genocidal context.64 A similar reasoning 
regarding the necessity to infer genocidal intent was embraced in the Kayishema 
case by the ICTR.65 In Kayishema, ICTR judges held that the vast number of 
Tutsi victims constituted evidence of the defendant’s intent to destroy this ethnic 
group.66 However, the Akayesu and Kayishema courts have warned that victim 
numbers are not dispositive and that the overall social and political context 
within which genocidal acts are committed are relevant towards the finding of 
genocide.67 According to the Akayesu and Kayishema cases, factors to take into 
account when examining whether genocidal intent exists include: the scale and 
 
 60 INT’L CRIMINAL LAW SERVS., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW & PRACTICE TRAINING MATERIALS: 
GENOCIDE 10, 44, http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_6_Genocide.pdf. 
 61 See id. at 10–12, 21, 24–25, 44–45. 
 62 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 523 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 63 Id. ¶ 485. 
 64 See Nersessian, supra note 18, at 268–69, 271–72 (criticizing the Trial Chamber in the Akayesu case for 
conceiving of genocidal intent in particularly narrow terms by holding that the intent requirement under the 
definition of genocide may only be satisfied if prosecutors can show that the defendant committed murder with 
intent to cause death). 
 65 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, ¶ 91 (May 21, 1999), http://unictr. 
unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-95-1/trial-judgements/en/990521.pdf. 
 66 Id. ¶ 533. 
 67 Nersessian, supra note 18, at 266.  
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nature of the atrocities, the discriminatory targeting of only particular groups, 
methodical and systematic planning of the killings and other genocidal acts, 
weapons employed and the extent of victims’ injuries, and documents which 
may reflect participation in or knowledge of the atrocities.68 
A strict reading of the Genocide Convention was espoused by the ICJ a 
decade later. In the 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina initiated proceedings in the ICJ 
against Serbia for violations of the Genocide Convention.69 Article IX of the 
Genocide Convention provides that the ICJ shall have jurisdiction over all 
disputes arising under the Convention.70 The ICJ decided in 2007 that the 
Srebrenica massacre, where approximately 5,000–8,000 Bosniak males were 
killed, constituted an act of genocide because it had been committed with the 
intent to destroy a protected (national) group in whole or in part.71 The ICJ 
found, however, that other atrocities committed in Bosnia had not been 
committed with the same genocidal intent and thus did not amount to genocide 
under the Genocide Convention.72 The ICJ noted that it was not enough to 
establish “that deliberate unlawful killings of members of the group have 
occurred,” but “[t]he additional intent must also be established . . . .”73 
It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because 
they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a 
discriminatory intent. . . . The acts listed in Article II must be done 
with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part. The words 
“as such” emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group.74 
 
 68 Id. Some earlier ICTY cases are consistent with this interpretation of the intent requirement for genocide. 
See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 73 (Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.refworld. 
org/docid/4147fe474.html. In Jelisić, the ICTY Trial Chamber confirmed that the existence of genocidal acts 
toward one specific protected group may be used in establishing the presumption of genocidal intent. Id. (holding 
that “an individual knowingly acting against the backdrop of widespread and systematic violence being 
committed against only one specific group could not reasonably deny that he chose his victims 
discriminatorily”). 
 69 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. 
& Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 18 ¶ 1 (Feb. 26). 
 70 Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. IX (“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility 
of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International 
Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”).  
 71 Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. 18 ¶ 297. 
 72 Id. ¶¶ 277, 319. 
 73 Id. ¶ 187. 
 74 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The ICJ also distinguished between persecution as a crime against humanity 
and genocide. It cited the ICTY Kupreškić case, explaining that “[w]hile in the 
case of persecution the discriminatory intent can take multifarious inhumane 
forms . . . in the case of genocide that intent must be accompanied by the 
intention to destroy, in whole or in part, the group to which the victims of the 
genocide belong.”75 The ICJ also distinguished between ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. It defined ethnic cleansing as “rendering an area ethnically 
homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups 
from the area” and cautioned that ethnic cleansing can be a form of genocide 
only if it falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited by Article II of the 
Genocide Convention.76 
Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘ethnically 
homogeneous,’ nor the operations that may be carried out to 
implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the 
intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy, in whole or in part’ a 
particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a 
group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to 
destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic 
consequence of the displacement.77 
The ICJ ultimately held that Serbia was not responsible under the Genocide 
Convention for genocide directly, but was responsible for failure to prevent 
genocide in Bosnia.78 In a subsequent ruling in 2015, the World Court ruled that 
Serbia had not committed genocide in its war with Croatia during the 1990s.79 
In this ruling, the ICJ confirmed again that acts of ethnic cleansing may not 
amount to genocide if such acts do not carry with them the specific intent to 
physically destroy a protected group. The Akayesu and Kayishema cases in the 
ICTR and the Bosnia v. Serbia case in the ICJ display international judges 
narrowly interpreting the intent requirement under the Genocide Convention. 
The Karadžić case, discussed below, demonstrates an evolution in judicial 
interpretation of the Convention, as ICTY judges in Karadžić appear more 
willing to infer genocidal intent and to embrace a generally broader view of the 
Convention. 
 
 75 Id. ¶ 188. 
 76 Id. ¶ 190 (citing Interim Report by the Commission of Experts, S/35274, ¶ 55 (1993)). 
 77 Id. ¶ 190. 
 78 Id. ¶¶ 461–62, 471. 
 79 UN Court Dismisses Croatia and Serbia Genocide Claims, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-europe-31104973. 
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On March 24, 2016, the ICTY Trial Chamber convicted Radovan Karadžić, 
the former political leader of the Bosnian Serbs during the 1990s civil war, for 
numerous crimes committed during the conflict and sentenced him to forty years 
imprisonment.80 The case against Karadžić was complex and consisted of four 
different sets of charges: the crimes in a number of Bosnian municipalities; the 
siege of Sarajevo; the taking of U.N. hostages; and the Srebrenica massacre.81 
This Article will focus on the two sets of charges for genocide that had been 
asserted against Karadžić—one for genocide in Bosnian municipalities other 
than Srebrenica and one related to the Srebrenica genocide. The ICTY Trial 
Chamber acquitted Karadžić of the former but convicted him of the latter.82 
Karadžić was charged for genocide under Article 4 of the ICTY Statute.83 
Article 4 adopts the same definition of genocide as the Genocide Convention 
and is thus reflective of customary law.84 Regarding genocide charges in 
Bosnian municipalities, the Trial Chamber (like the ICJ in the Bosnia v. Serbia 
case discussed above) found that the crimes in the municipalities satisfied the 
actus reus of genocide, but that the specific mens rea had not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.85 For example, the Chamber thought that genocidal 
intent could not be inferred from the speeches, statements, and actions of 
Karadžić and other members of the joint criminal enterprise, or from the overall 
pattern of the crimes.86 The Chamber noted that while Karadžić and others may 
have engaged in ethnic cleansing by attempting to remove Muslim Bosnians 
from many parts of Bosnia, this finding does not lead to the establishment of 
genocidal intent.87 The Trial Chamber also noted that Karadžić and other JCE 
participants made statements and engaged in acts that had two effects: first, 
“identifying the historic enemies of the Bosnian Serbs and furthering the 
 
 80 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 2536–3537, 6070–72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_judgement. 
pdf. 
 81 Milanovic, supra note 9.  
 82 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, ¶¶ 2537, 6071. 
 83 Id. at 203, ¶¶ 537–38. 
 84 Id. ¶ 539. 
 85 Id. ¶¶ 2625–26. 
 86 Id. ¶¶ 2605, 2625. 
 87 See, e.g., KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW II 15–16 (2014). On this issue, the 
ICTY Trial Chamber was consistent with the view of many scholars who had already distinguished between 
ethnic cleansing and the existence of genocidal intent and thus genocide. Id. 
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objective of ethnic separation,”88 and second, “show[ing] that the Bosnian Serbs 
were prepared to use force and violence against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats in order to achieve their objectives and assert their historic territorial 
claims.”89 The Trial Chamber noted that by these statements and acts, Karadžić 
“intended to threaten the Bosnian Muslims against pursuing independence for 
[Bosnia & Herzegovina] and [show] that he was fully aware that a potential 
conflict would be extremely violent.”90 However, this type of evidence did not 
suffice to establish that Karadžić (and others) had the genocidal intent to 
physically destroy the Bosniaks and other non-Serbs in Bosnian 
municipalities.91 Thus, Karadžić was acquitted on this charge. 
Karadžić was, however, found guilty of genocide for the Srebrenica killings. 
Here, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that Karadžić had the specific intent to 
order the killings, but reached this conclusion based on an inference.92 In fact, 
the prosecution was never able to find concrete evidence that Karadžić truly 
knew that the killings would occur and that Karadžić intended for the killings to 
take place.93 Instead, the prosecution’s case was circumstantial.94 The Trial 
Chamber first discussed the development of the common plan, or the JCE, to 
eliminate all Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, which eventually morphed into 
an agreement to kill all Bosniak adult males while forcibly transferring the 
women and children out of the area.95 The Trial Chamber held that: 
The Chamber is of the view that by designing and conducting a 
simultaneous operation to kill the Bosnian Muslim men and boys of 
Srebrenica while the forcible removal of the women, children, and 
elderly men was ongoing, the common purpose of the plan to eliminate 
the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica was expanded so as to include the 
 
 88 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶ 2598 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. 
 89 Id. ¶ 2599. 
 90 Id. ¶ 2600. 
 91 See id. ¶ 2605. “[T]he evidence does not support a conclusion that the only reasonable inference is that 
the Accused or any of the alleged members of the Overarching JCE had the intent to physically destroy the 
Bosnian Muslim and/or the Bosnian Croat groups in the Count 1 Municipalities as such.” Id. 
 92 Milanovic, supra note 9.  
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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killing of all the men and boys, and multiple members of the plan 
agreed to it.96 
The Chamber thus concluded that:  
[T]he members of the Srebrenica JCE who agreed to the expansion 
of means so as to encompass the killing of the men and boys 
intended to kill all the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim males, which 
intent in the circumstances is tantamount to the intent to destroy the 
Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.97  
The Trial Chamber also concluded that Karadžić was a participant of this 
JCE based on a conversation that Karadžić had with Miroslav Deronjić, the 
civilian administrator of the Srebrenica region, who had been appointed to this 
post by Karadžić himself.98 The Chamber found:  
[A]t approximately 8 p.m. on 13 July, Deronjić and the Accused spoke 
through an intermediary about the fate of the thousands of Bosnian 
Muslim male detainees then being held on buses and in detention 
facilities in Bratunac town. . . . The Chamber notes that, despite the 
fact that Deronjić and the Accused did not explicitly mention the 
killing of detainees during the conversation, they spoke in code, 
referring to the detainees as “goods” which had to be placed “inside 
the warehouses before twelve tomorrow”. The Accused further 
specified, “not in the warehouses /?over there/, but somewhere else”, 
[sic] which the Chamber has already interpreted as a direction to move 
the detainees to Zvornik. The Chamber recalls that, earlier that 
evening, Deronjić had complained to Beara about the detainees’ 
presence in Bratunac, and that upon encountering Deronjić in Bratunac 
town, Davidović had urged him to use his connections to the Accused 
to have the buses moved. Moreover, the Chamber recalls that 
immediately after this conversation, Beara and Deronjić discussed 
where—not whether—the detainees were to be killed. It is therefore 
clear that at the time of Beara and Deronjić’s conversation, a decision 
had already been made to kill the detainees, and Deronjić invoked the 
Accused’s authority to convince Beara to accede to their movement to 
Zvornik. In the Chamber’s view, the use of code to refer to the 
detainees, as well as the direction to move them toward Zvornik, 
 
 96 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶ 5736 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. 
 97 Id. ¶ 5741. 
 98 Id. ¶¶ 5772–5773, 5811.  
STERIO GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/20/2017 2:13 PM 
286 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
demonstrates the malign intent behind the conversation. The Chamber 
finds that this conversation, in addition to the Accused’s subsequent 
acts as described further below, demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt 
the Accused’s agreement to the expansion of the objective to 
encompass the killing of the Bosnian Muslim males.99 
The Trial Chamber also noted that Karadžić continued to seek information 
about what was happening in Srebrenica through various channels, and he had a 
meeting with Deronjić on July 14, 1995.100 This meeting was pivotal in the 
reasoning and legal analysis of the Trial Chamber. According to the Trial 
Chamber, Karadžić met with Deronjić alone between 12:40 p.m. and 1:10 p.m. 
on July 14; both leaders later met together with a larger delegation from 
Srebrenica for about four hours.101 The Trial Chamber concluded: 
In relation to the content of the conversation between Deronjić and the 
Accused prior to their meeting with the larger group, the Chamber 
notes that it has no direct evidence thereof. However, it received 
evidence that, during the second meeting, Deronjić reported on the 
situation in Srebrenica. As stated above, the Chamber is satisfied that 
Deronjić had been aware of the killings at the Kravica Warehouse since 
the evening of 13 July. More importantly, the Chamber recalls the 
conversation between the Accused and Deronjić the night before in 
which the Accused ordered the transfer of the detainees from Bratunac 
to Zvornik. The Chamber also recalls Deronjić’s participation in the 
efforts to bury the bodies of those killed at the Kravica Warehouse, 
starting in the early hours of 14 July. The Chamber also received 
evidence that the Accused and Deronjić had frequent communications, 
either by telephone or in person, during the Srebrenica operation. 
According to officials from Bratunac municipality, in his official 
capacity as civilian commissioner of Srebrenica, Deronjić should have 
reported about the killings at the Kravica Warehouse to the Accused. 
More specifically, Simić testified that Deronjić told him that he had 
informed the Accused about the events at the Kravica Warehouse the 
day after the incident. The Chamber received evidence that there was 
no mention or discussion about the executions of detainees in 
Srebrenica during the meeting with the Srebrenica representatives. 
Nevertheless, the Chamber has no doubt that during the individual 
meeting between Deronjić and the Accused, they both discussed the 
killings at the Kravica Warehouse, and the implementation of the 
 
 99 Id. ¶ 5805 (second emphasis added). 
 100 Id. ¶ 5807. 
 101 Id. 
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Accused’s order to transport the detainees from Bratunac to Zvornik 
by midday that day.102 
The Trial Chamber thus relied on the conversations between Deronjić and 
Karadžić to infer that Karadžić knew about the killings in Srebrenica as they 
took place. The Trial Chamber, however, drew inferences about the content of 
these conversations, about which it had almost no direct evidence. After 
establishing that Karadžić knew about the Srebrenica killings, the Trial Chamber 
also needed to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Karadžić, as a 
participant of the JCE, intended for the killings to take place.103 The Trial 
Chamber reached this determination based on yet another inference: 
The Chamber also finds that the Accused adopted and embraced the 
expansion of the plan to entail the killing the [sic] Bosnian Muslim 
men and boys in Srebrenica during his conversation with Deronjić on 
the evening of 13 July [1995]. Given the Accused’s position as RS 
President and Supreme Commander, as well as the evidence 
demonstrating the continuous flow of information he was seeking and 
receiving from the ground from many different sources the Chamber 
considers that the Accused must have known about the killing aspect 
of the plan to eliminate at some point prior to his conversation with 
Deronjić in the evening of 13 July. However, the Chamber can only 
make a positive determination as to the Accused’s agreement to the 
expansion of the means so as to encompass the killing of the men and 
boys as of the moment of the conversation with Deronjić. The 
Accused’s shared intent is reaffirmed by the fact that, from the moment 
he directed Deronjić to move the detainees to Zvornik the Accused 
became, and subsequently continued to be, actively involved in 
overseeing the implementation of the plan to eliminate the Bosnian 
Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys.104 
 
 102 Id. ¶ 5808. 
 103 Id. ¶¶ 5810, 5814.  
 104 Id. ¶ 5811. It should also be noted that Karadžić’s conviction rested on the theory of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, and that his intent to order and implement killings at Srebrenica had to have been shared with other 
members of the JCE. See Kai Ambos, Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent as the “Only Reasonable Inference”?, EJIL: 
TALK! (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/karadzics-genocidal-intent-as-the-only-reasonable-inference/ 
[hereinafter Ambos, Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent]. Scholars have already warned about the inherent difficulty 
of inferring genocidal intent in situations of JCE regarding the Karadžić judgment. Id. According to Professor 
Kai Ambos,  
[u]p to this point, the Chamber has at best indirectly affirmed Karadzic’s genocidal intent. 
Explicitly, it has only found—quite plausibly—his knowledge and inferred from this, his shared 
intent with regard to the Srebrenica (expanded) JCE. Yet, depending on the definition of this JCE, 
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According to the Trial Chamber, Karadžić was “actively involved” in 
supervising and implementing the plan to eliminate Bosniaks from Srebrenica 
by disseminating false information about what happened there.105 The Chamber 
concluded that this act showed that “the Accused intended to shield the true 
actions of the Bosnian Serb Forces from international attention and 
intervention.”106 The Trial Chamber also established that Karadžić’s failure to 
prosecute the direct perpetrators of the Srebrenica massacre, as well as his praise 
and reward of the direct perpetrators, demonstrate Karadžić’s genocidal intent: 
“in the Chamber’s view, there is no doubt that the Accused knew that the 
thousands of Bosnian Muslim male detainees being held by the Bosnian Serb 
Forces in the Srebrenica area constituted a very significant percentage of the 
Bosnian Muslim males from Srebrenica.”107 
Moreover, based on Karadžić’s actions and knowledge about the events at 
Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber inferred that Karadžić must have agreed with the 
other participants of the JCE that Bosniaks should be eliminated from 
Srebrenica.108 
The Chamber therefore takes particular note of the fact that, despite his 
contemporaneous knowledge of its progress as set out above, the 
Accused agreed with and therefore did not intervene to halt or hinder 
the killing aspect of the plan to eliminate between the evening of 13 
July and 17 July. Instead, he ordered that the detainees be moved to 
Zvornik, where they were killed. Moreover, once Pandurević reported 
on 16 July that he had opened a corridor to allow members of the 
column who had not yet been captured or surrendered to pass through, 
Karišik was promptly sent to investigate and the corridor was closed 
within a day. Finally, the Chamber recalls that although he touted the 
opening of the corridor when speaking to the international press, in a 
closed session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held weeks later, the 
Accused expressed regret that the Bosnian Muslim males had managed 
to pass through Bosnian Serb lines. Accordingly, the Chamber 
considers that the only reasonable inference available on such evidence 
 
this intent could be limited to the (forced) removal of Bosnian Muslims, perhaps also including 
some killing, but this does not necessarily amount to the intent to destroy this group as such.  
Id.  
 105 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶ 5811 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. ¶¶ 5813, 5829. 
 108 Id. ¶¶ 5810, 5814, 5821.  
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is that the Accused shared with Mladić, Beara, and Popović the intent 
that every able-bodied Bosnian Muslim male from Srebrenica be 
killed, which, in the Chamber’s view, amounts to the intent to destroy 
the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.109 
The above-discussed decision of the Trial Chamber can be interpreted as a 
novel understanding of the mens rea requirement for genocide.110 In fact, the 
entire reasoning of the Trial Chamber rests on what reasonable inferences can 
be drawn from Karadžić’s conversation and other contacts with Deronjić. As 
Marko Milanovic has noted, “[i]t is clear that had it not been for the phone 
conversation and subsequent meeting with Deronjić, Karadžić could not have 
been convicted as a participant in the genocidal JCE.”111 However, scholars have 
pointed out that it is not entirely clear that the only reasonable inference from 
these conversations between Karadžić and Deronjić is that Karadžić knew about 
the killings.112 One could argue, for example, that Karadžić may have been 
informed about the plan to forcibly transfer all Bosniak males from the 
Srebrenica area, but not to kill them. It is not clear that the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” prosecutorial standard had been established in this case regarding 
Karadžić’s mens rea to participate in the genocidal JCE at Srebrenica. 
On the other hand, in the face of overwhelming evidence indicating that 
genocidal acts had occurred in Srebrenica and that Karadžić was the general 
leader of Bosnian Serbs who did nothing to stop the genocide from taking place, 
it appears reasonable that the ICTY would determine that Karadžić must have 
intended for such genocidal acts to take place.113 As the ICTY Trial Chamber 
did in Karadžić, inferring knowledge and then basing intent on the inferred 
knowledge may be the only available judicial strategy for judges examining 
cases under the narrow definition of genocide under the Genocide 
Convention.114 Under the Convention, the general culpability of the defendant 
must be established “beyond a reasonable doubt” and imposing the genocide 
label upon a particular defendant is important for the historical legacy of the 
conflict.115 The Part below will discuss the Karadžić approach and the necessity 
 
 109 Id. ¶ 5830. 
 110 See AMBOS, supra note 87.  
 111 Milanovic, supra note 9.  
 112 Id. See Ambos, Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent, supra note 104.  
 113 Ambos, Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent, supra note 104. 
 114 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 4708 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Karadžić/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. 
 115 See Milanovic, supra note 9. See generally Genocide Convention, supra note 19. 
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to revisit the strict interpretation of genocide under the Convention in light of 
modern-day conflicts. 
III. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING GENOCIDE? 
The ICTR Trial Chamber held in Akayesu that “intent is a mental factor 
which is difficult, even impossible, to determine.”116 As noted above, the ICTR 
recognized in the Akayesu case that, because concrete evidence of genocidal 
intent is most likely unavailable, intent must be inferred from other factual 
circumstances.117 Thus, as early as Akayesu, international courts recognized the 
necessity to infer genocidal intent. The ICTY had also embraced this approach 
in some of its earlier cases.118 Specifically, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that 
specific intent for the crime of genocide 
may be inferred from a number of facts such as the general political 
doctrine which gave rise to the acts possibly covered by the definition 
in Article 4, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts. 
The intent may also be inferred from the perpetration of acts which 
violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the 
very foundation of the group - acts which are not in themselves covered 
by the list in Article 4(2) but which are committed as part of the same 
pattern of conduct.119 
Thus, in relatively recent case law, both the ICTR and the ICTY have 
recognized the necessity to infer genocidal intent based on overall factual 
circumstances of a particular conflict. The Genocide Convention was negotiated 
in the wake of World War II with the Holocaust paradigm as backdrop.120 It is 
fair to assume that the Genocide Convention drafters did not envision modern-
day conflicts where leaders may target, in a genocidal manner, citizens of their 
own countries and members of their own societies.121 It is also reasonable to 
 
 116 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement ¶ 523 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 117 Id.  
 118 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 73 (Dec. 14, 1999), http://www. 
refworld.org/docid/4147fe474.html; Quigley, supra note 50. 
 119 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, IT-95-5-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 94 (July 11, 1996), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/related/en/rev-ii960716-
e.pdf. 
 120 See supra Part I. See generally Incitement to Genocide in International Law, HOLOCAUST 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007839 (last updated July 2, 2016). 
 121 Kok-Thay Eng, Redefining Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH: THE INT’L ALLIANCE TO END GENOCIDE, 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/redefininggenocide.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
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recognize that most rogue leaders, prone to engaging in genocidal behaviors 
against particular groups, do not publish edicts and other documents 
demonstrating specific genocidal intent.122 While Hitler meticulously 
documented his plans to persecute Jews,123 other rogue leaders such as Pol Pot, 
Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, or Jean-Paul Akayesu did not engage 
in such written planning and did not leave the same type of evidentiary trail 
behind them.124 In order to secure any genocide convictions, prosecutors in both 
the ICTR and the ICTY have had to infer genocidal intent from specific patterns 
of acts and behaviors.125 With this context in mind, it appears that the Karadžić 
court did nothing particularly unusual when it announced that it would infer 
Karadžić’s intent as a general matter. 
The ICTY did, however, engage in somewhat unusual judicial reasoning 
when, in discussing Karadžić’s alleged intent, it adopted the “only reasonable 
inference” standard, which was based on evidence that did little to establish that 
Karadžić actually knew about the Srebrenica killings and agreed that the killings 
should go forward.126 The ICTY decided, as discussed above, that Karadžić must 
have known about the killings at Srebrenica and, based on other factors, he must 
have agreed with the plan to kill thousands of Bosniaks at Srebrenica.127 Thus, 
the ICTY Trial Chamber went beyond what the Akayesu and Kayishama courts 
and the ICJ had done. The Chamber imputed knowledge to Karadžić about the 
Srebrenica killings based on Karadžić’s conversation and meeting with 
Deronjić, and then from that inference of actual knowledge, inferred genocidal 
intent. As other scholars have already noted, even if Karadžić did know about 
the plan to eliminate Bosniaks from Srebrenica, it could be argued that Karadžić 
 
 122 Katherine Goldsmith, The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and Its Effect on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based Approach, 5 GENOCIDE STUD. & 
PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 238, 242 (2010). 
 123 See “Final Solution”: Overview, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article. 
php?ModuleId=10005151 (last updated July 2, 2016). 
 124 See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON J. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 237 (1st ed., 1997); MICHAEL J. KELLY, PROSECUTING 
CORPORATIONS FOR GENOCIDE 76 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016); Steve Coll, In the Shadow of the Holocaust, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/1994/09/25/in-the-
shadow-of-the-holocaust/8a08e0b4-c929-4694-9f68-7597b5e254dc/.  
 125 INT’L CRIMINAL LAW SERVS., supra note 60, at 10–11. 
 126 See Milanovic, supra note 9; Ambos, Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent, supra note 104.  
 127 Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Seven Senior Bosnian Serb 
Officials Convicted of Srebenica Crimes (June 10, 2010). 
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only agreed to the removal of Bosniaks but not to their killing.128 “Karadžić’s 
certain knowledge of the events at Srebrenica, allows for many (reasonable) 
inferences.”129 
The judicial gymnastics performed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in order to 
convict Karadžić perfectly demonstrate the difficult legal standards of genocide 
under the Genocide Convention. While many may agree that the double 
inference—that of knowledge leading to that of intent—is not the most sound 
judicial analysis,130 others would argue that the Genocide Convention is simply 
too narrow for modern-day warfare.131 If one is serious about the crime of 
genocide and labeling certain acts as genocide for the sake of their historical 
legacy, then one should dispose of appropriate legal tools in order to secure 
genocide convictions and verdicts. It may be time to revisit the Genocide 
Convention’s definition of genocide. The definition of genocide could be 
revisited in two different ways: first, by eliminating the phrase “as such” and 
second, by interpreting the intent requirement behind the crime of ethnic cleansing 
more closely to the intent requirement behind the crime of genocide itself, to allow 
for acts of ethnic cleansing to constitute genocide. 
First, eliminating the phrase “as such” may help re-conceptualize the 
definition of genocide. Genocide would consist of various enumerated acts (in 
Article II of the Genocide Convention), committed against members of one of 
the four protected groups. This type of re-drafting of the genocide definition 
would allow for Khmer Rouge-committed killings of the Cambodian 
intelligentsia and Soviet killings of Polish intelligentsia at Katyn to rise to the 
level of genocide. In other words, acts committed with some specific motivation, 
such as eliminating members of a society’s elite classes, would constitute 
genocide as long as they resulted in the destruction of a protected group, in 
whole or in part. This approach would allow for acts of reprehensible persecution 
of members of a subgroup within one of the protected groups to constitute 
genocide. For example, if individuals exhibiting homosexual characteristics 
within a larger national group were persecuted in a manner corresponding with 
one of the enumerated actus reus from the genocide definition, then this type of 
 
 128 Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Tribunal Convicts Radovan 
Karadžić for Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mar. 24, 2016). 
 129 Ambos, Karadzic’s Genocidal Intent, supra note 104.  
 130 Id. 
 131 See Overview: Defining Genocide, CTR. ON L. & GLOBALIZATION, http://clg.portalxm.com/library/ 
evidence.cfm?evidence_summary_id=250040 (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
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persecution would amount to genocide, because a protected (national) group was 
being destroyed—regardless of the more specific motivation behind the acts of 
destruction (to destroy homosexual members of a protected group). Similarly, if 
only those speaking a foreign language or belonging to a specific political party 
within a larger national group were targeted in a genocidal manner, these acts 
would also amount to genocide because part of a national group was being 
destroyed.132 
The drafting history of the Genocide Convention indicates that the treaty 
drafters did not contemplate the mass killing of one segment of a group by other 
members of the same group. Because of this, the drafters adopted a restrictive 
view of the definition of genocide.133 Thus, it may be argued that this definition 
no longer corresponds to the realities of modern-day warfare. The ICTR, as 
mentioned above, has already accepted a broader view of protected groups by 
holding that such groups are those where membership is an immutable 
characteristic.134 The ICTR presumably did so in order to ensure that Tutsis were 
recognized as a protected group under the Genocide Convention, in the context 
of a modern-day conflict where part of a national group is targeting another part 
of the same group.135 Sadly, other recent conflicts have exhibited similar 
characteristics136 and in order to effectively utilize the criminalization of 
genocide as a tool of international criminal law, it may be time to re-
conceptualize the Convention’s restrictive definition.137 
 
 132 Another way to reach a similar result—extending the protections of the Genocide Convention to other 
types of groups—would be to interpret the listing of protected groups in Article II of the Convention as non-
exhaustive. Some scholars have already argued that political groups, because they may coincide with other 
groups, such as national groups, are covered by Article II. See, e.g., PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: 
GENOCIDE 62 (1950). A similar argument could be made for other types of subgroups of protected groups, or 
groups which may coincide with protected groups. Id. But see Nersessian, supra note 18, at 262 (arguing that 
the Genocide Convention should not extend to cover political groups or other non-protected groups). 
 133 RATNER & ABRAMS, 2d ed., supra note 35, at 246 (“[T]he drafters did not appear to have contemplated 
the mass killing of one segment of a group by another segment of that same group”). The authors also noted “the 
deliberately limited scope of the Convention’s list of protected groups.” Id. 
 134 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement ¶ 495 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 135 See David Shea Bettwy, The Genocide Convention and Unprotected Groups: Is the Scope of Protection 
Expanding Under Customary International Law?, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167, 190–91 (2011). 
 136 John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Daesh and Genocide at the Press Briefing Room (Mar. 17, 
2016), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/254782.htm. 
 137 It should be noted, however, that revising a large multilateral treaty, such as the Genocide Convention, 
is a time-consuming and difficult endeavor that may be virtually impossible to accomplish because agreement 
by most treaty parties would be necessary. States may have very little political will to re-negotiate a large 
multilateral treaty, and the likelihood of treaty revision is very small in the near future. Nonetheless, the idea of 
revising the Genocide Convention is important and should remain the subject of scholarly discussions.  
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Second, the intent requirement behind acts of ethnic cleansing could be 
interpreted as coinciding with the special intent requirement behind genocide. 
This type of novel approach would potentially allow for some acts of ethnic 
cleansing to be labeled as genocide. Thus far, courts have been mindful to draw 
a distinction between acts of ethnic cleansing lacking genocidal intent and actual 
acts of genocide,138 coupled with the specific intent to destroy a protected group. 
Ethnic cleansing typically implies “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by 
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”139 
However, acts of ethnic cleansing are not always committed with the intent to 
destroy a group or part of a group. 
Just as acts of ethnic cleansing may be used as support for, but do not 
constitute genocidal acts, a policy of ethnic cleansing may be used as 
evidence of, but does not itself constitute, genocidal intent. That is, the 
act of forcibly displacing a population may amount to genocide if it is 
in furtherance of a genocidal policy. But a policy of ethnic cleansing 
does not establish genocidal intent, even if the implementation of such 
a policy entails genocidal acts that cause physical or biological 
destruction. According to the ICTY and the ICJ, the basis for 
classifying ethnic cleansing separately from genocide is simple: a 
policy of ethnic cleansing is not the same as the intent to destroy.140 
The distinction may no longer have a logical basis in light of modern-day 
conflicts, where ethnic cleansing has become a routine tool of warfare and where 
the label of genocide may bring necessary closure, providing a historical 
narrative and establish a relevant legacy. In fact, the U.N. General Assembly has 
recognized, in a 1992 resolution condemning the violence taking place in the 
former Yugoslavia, that ethnic cleansing could constitute a form of genocide.141 
In practice, many ethnic cleansing practices are coupled with the intent to 
eliminate specific groups from specific geographic areas and the line between 
genocide and ethnic cleansing may be very difficult to draw.142 Some have 
already pointed out that displacing a group, under a policy of ethnic cleansing, 
 
 138 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. 
& Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 18 ¶ 190 (Feb. 26). 
 139 Id. (quoting Interim Report by the Commission of Experts, S/35374, ¶ 55 (1993)). 
 140 Micol Sirkin, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return to Established 
Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 489, 506 (2010) (emphasis in 
original).  
 141 George J. Andreopoulos, Ethnic Cleansing: War Crime, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing (last updated Aug. 9, 2016). 
 142 Id. 
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may effectively destroy a group.143 Thus, the distinction between ethnic 
cleansing and genocide becomes meaningless. In places like Bosnia and South 
Sudan,144 it may be that both ethnic cleansing and genocide took place, and it 
may be impossible to separate the two types of acts meaningfully. Some have 
already criticized the Karadžić judgment because of its willingness to label only 
the Srebrenica killings as genocide and its holding that other acts in other 
municipalities did not amount to genocide.145 This has allowed nationalist 
groups in both Serbia and Bosnia to welcome and criticize the judgment at the 
same time, further fueling nationalistic tendencies and instability in the 
region.146 Professor Marko Milanovic described the reactions as “exactly what 
one might have expected—while many Bosniaks welcomed the conviction, they 
also decried the acquittal for genocide outside Srebrenica, whereas the current 
Bosnian Serb president has decried the judgment as yet another example of the 
ICTY’s anti-Serb bias.”147 If the legal definitions of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, and in particular the mens rea requirements behind the two, were 
interpreted similarly, many acts of ethnic cleansing could arguably constitute 
genocide. Courts like the Karadžić Trial Chamber may be in an easier legal 
position where they would no longer need to always distinguish between ethnic 
cleansing and genocide. 
Thus, the definition of genocide could be re-conceptualized if the intent 
requirement behind genocide were more broadly aligned with the intent 
requirement behind acts of ethnic cleansing. Under a traditional view 
distinguishing between ethnic cleansing and genocide, acts amounting to ethnic 
cleansing are committed with the intent to achieve ethnic homogeneity, whereas acts 
of genocide are committed with the intent to destroy.148 It may be possible to argue 
that the two types of intent are not distinct. 
 
 143 Sirkin, supra note 140, at 514. 
 144 See Sandro Krkljes, Bosnian Genocide, WORLD WITHOUT GENOCIDE (Mar. 2014), http:// 
worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/bosnian-genocide. See generally Darfur Genocide, WORLD 
WITHOUT GENOCIDE, http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/ genocides-and-conflicts/darfur-genocide (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2017). 
 145 See generally Stéphanie Maupas, Question of Genocide at the Heart of Karadzic Judgment, JUST. INFO 
(Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/26585-question-of-genocide-at-the-heart-of-
Karadzic-judgment.html. 
 146 See Tim Hume, Radovan Karadzic Found Guilty of Genocide, Sentenced to 40 Years, CNN (Mar. 24, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/24/europe/Karadzic-war-crimes-verdict/. 
 147 Milanovic, supra note 9.  
 148 Sirkin, supra note 140, at 491. 
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Where a policy of ethnic cleansing aims to forcibly remove an ethnic 
group from a substantial geographic region and the portion of the group 
constitutes either a large or a significant portion of the entire ethnic 
group, the intent to destroy is established.  
  Instead of interpreting the intent to achieve ethnic homogeneity as 
distinct from the intent to destroy, international courts and tribunals 
ought to interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as a genocidal policy 
where evidence sufficiently meets the stringent requirements for 
genocidal intent—the specific intent to destroy a protected group “as 
such.”149 
This type of interpretation of the specific intent requirement behind ethnic 
cleansing150 would allow courts to establish acts of genocide in cases like 
Karadžić, where evidence of the former may be rampant but where, under a strict 
reading of the Genocide Convention, mens rea for genocide itself may be 
difficult to prove. The Karadžić case itself perfectly demonstrates this type of 
legal difficulty and underscores the necessity of establishing a closer parallel 
between ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
Moreover, maintaining a strict definition of genocide may lead toward the 
inability of various courts to label certain acts as genocide. Thus, horrific acts 
committed against specific groups on a wide spread basis may not amount to 
genocide. Genocide has been viewed in international criminal law as the most 
serious crime,151 more heinous than crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
However, classifying an atrocity as genocide has a much greater legal 
and political effect than classifying it as a crime against humanity. The 
legal significance does not lie in the severity of the sentence but rather 
in the stability and certainty that the Genocide Convention provides. 
Crimes against humanity are articulated only in statutes founding 
international criminal courts or tribunals and not in any multilateral 
treaty or agreement like the Genocide Convention. The Genocide 
Convention and its legislative history have generated special legal 
duties and remedies. Unlike crimes against humanity, the crime of 
genocide clearly creates obligations on state parties to the Convention 
 
 149 Id. at 525. 
 150 Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. 
& Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 18 ¶ 190 (Feb. 26) (quoting Interim Report by the Commission of 
Experts, S/35374, ¶ 55 (1993) (defining ethnic cleansing)). 
 151 Sirkin, supra note 140, at 496. 
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and provides state parties with civil remedies not available to states 
victimized by crimes against humanity.152 
While this view may be completely unfounded, it has permeated the 
international criminal law community, and prosecutors within several 
international criminal tribunals have clamored for the opportunity to secure 
genocide convictions.153 Under these circumstances, failing to attach the label 
of genocide to a specific perpetrator may be viewed as a failure of international 
criminal justice and as a vindication of reprehensible crimes and policies. If 
genocide occurred in Bosnia but not in South Sudan, this somehow suggests that 
lesser crimes took place in the latter and that victims of the latter may be less 
worthy of international attention. “By categorizing ethnic cleansing as 
persecution and not as genocide, international courts and tribunals devalue the 
permanent destruction that ethnic cleansing causes.”154 If we continue to believe 
in the gravity of genocide, we should re-conceptualize the term so that it 
corresponds better to modern-day conflicts and enables courts and prosecutors 
to effectively use it.  
As Professor Milanovic stated, “[t]he disconnect between [genocide’s] 
incoherent public perception and the technical, legal (and morally completely 
arbitrary) definition of the concept, coupled with the special stigma attached to 
this word (which consequentially devalues all other international crimes as 
somehow being ‘less bad’), creates fertile ground for political manipulation.”155 
In other words, while the crime of genocide was appropriately coined and 
created in the wake of World War II, with the Holocaust paradigm as a model, 
it may be time to revisit this crime’s definition, in order to assign it a more 
meaningful legal and political significance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Karadžić verdict in the ICTY is significant because it assigns individual 
criminal responsibility to one of the highest members of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership. Additionally, it contributes to the tribunal’s overall legacy—that of 
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 153 See Global Voices: Middle East, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 25, 2010), https:// 
iwpr.net/global-voices/prosecutors-seek-genocide-verdict-chemical-ali. See also Lawyers to Seek Genocide 
Charge Against Sudan’s Bashir, REUTERS: AFRICA (June 30, 2009), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
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 154 Sirkin, supra note 140, at 517. 
 155 Marko Milanovic, The Shameful Twenty Years of Srebrenica, EJIL: TALK! (July 13, 2015), http:// 
www.ejiltalk.org/the-shameful-twenty-years-of-srebrenica/. 
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creating a historical narrative for the region and attributing genocidal acts to 
specific leaders in the conflict. The verdict, however, also demonstrates the 
difficulty in applying a strict, historical view of genocide to modern-day 
conflicts. Most recent conflicts have been marred by incidents of ethnic 
cleansing and abhorrent violence where leaders have left very little paper 
evidence of their intentions, rendering any future prosecutions and convictions 
difficult. Modern-day courts increasingly rely on circumstantial evidence and 
infer the existence of genocidal intent based on the existence of overall patterns 
of persecution toward specific protected groups. In this climate, it is not 
surprising that the Karadžić Trial Chamber resorted to somewhat convoluted 
judicial reasoning in order to convict this defendant. Instead of encouraging 
future tribunals to engage in questionable legal analysis, it may be better to 
revisit our understanding of genocide in order to redefine its legal meaning and 
close the gap between ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
